Brexit might not be as integral to the political identities of Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak as it has been for Boris Johnson. Still, the two leadership candidates are closely linked to Johnson’s administration. Even with new leadership, a radical reset of EU–UK relations is unlikely.
Following Boris Johnson’s
announcement on 7 July that he would resign as UK prime minister,
Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and former Chancellor Rishi Sunak are the
two remaining candidates vying to be the Conservative Party’s next
leader and, consequently, his successor. In the past months, there was a
consensus in Brussels that for as long as Johnson remains in office,
there is little potential for repairing the deeply fractured EU–UK
relationship. Now that the end is in sight, does a new prime minister
offer any hope of repairing the damage Johnson will leave behind?
EU–UK relations take a backseat
Antagonistic
relations with the EU have been a cornerstone of Johnson’s popularity.
His star rose as a leader of the Vote Leave campaign during the 2016
Brexit referendum, and he won the 2019 general election on a promise to Get Brexit Done.
While prime minister, Johnson had a habit of opting for inflammatory
clashes with the EU when he needed to reinvigorate his Conservative
base.
Truss’ and Sunak’s political profiles are not as closely
linked to Brexit. There has been limited to no discussion in the recent
leadership debates on how they would approach relations with the EU.
Instead, the focus of this leadership contest centres on domestic issues
like tax cuts and the cost-of-living crisis.
This omission of
the EU from the debate is not necessarily a positive. Despite Brexit’s
increasingly obvious negative implications for the UK economy – it is
expected to be the G7’s slowest growing economy in
2023 –, neither candidate has put forward any meaningful strategy for a
new, more constructive approach to EU–UK relations. In fact, both seem
to implicitly agree with Johnson’s handling of the relationship. Johnson
was obliged to resign as prime minister due to his (mis)handling of an
internal Tory scandal, following on from Partygate. His handling of the
EU–UK relationship, or the heavily criticised Northern Ireland Protocol Bill (NIPB), was not at issue.
Truss embodies continuity
Indeed,
Truss, the frontrunner in the leadership contest, never resigned from
her post as foreign secretary and continues to serve in Johnson’s
caretaker government. Formerly a Remainer, she has worked hard the past
year to demonstrate her ‘Brexit credentials’. Truss took over as the
UK’s lead Brexit negotiator in December 2021.
While an initial effort was made to thaw relations with the EU
regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), Truss’ introduction of
the NIPB in June has won her few friends in Brussels, where it is viewed
as a violation of international law.
Truss consulted
with the Conservative Party’s European Research Group (ERG) before
bringing forward the bill, and many in Brussels believe that her
motivation in progressing the legislation was to solidify her chances as
Johnson’s successor among the Eurosceptic factions of the Conservative
Party.
Reliant on the Conservative Party’s Eurosceptic wing, it
is unlikely that Truss could roll back on her hard-line approach if she
becomes prime minister. This will further damage the EU–UK relationship,
as the EU has warned of retaliatory measures
should the NIPB become law. More Johnsonian tactics of brinksmanship
could be expected as a trade war with the EU becomes more likely.
Additionally, by introducing the bill, Truss seriously damaged her
credibility with her European counterpart, Commission Vice-President
Maroš Šefčovič. Any rebuilding of relations would be difficult under
Truss’ leadership.
Prospect for a reset under Sunak?
Former
Chancellor Sunak has maintained a greater distance from the toxic NIP
dispute. Despite campaigning for the UK to leave the EU in 2016, Sunak
has not made Euroscepticism a cornerstone of his leadership campaign to
the same extent as Johnson and now Truss. As such, there could be scope
to rebuild relations under a Sunak premiership. Reportedly,
while chancellor, Sunak opposed the NIPB and expressed concerns
regarding the cost of a potential EU–UK trade war on the UK economy. He did not vote on the bill on its second reading and has been referred to as the “least worse” candidate by Member of Parliament Stephen Farry of Northern Ireland’s Alliance Party.
Sunak’s
minimal interactions with his EU counterparts mean that, if selected to
be prime minister, EU–UK relations will begin from a more neutral
starting point. Given that he seems less interested in finding an
immediate solution on the NIP, space could be created to de-dramatise
and de-politicise the relationship. If the relations were relegated to a
‘third-order’ or bureaucratic level, managed within the formal
governance structures of the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and Trade
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), EU and UK officials might be able to
find joint solutions to many of the current technical problems regarding
the Protocol and other trade issues.
Additionally, Sunak is
less reliant on the support of the far-right, Eurosceptic wing of the
Conservative Party. If he were to run as the Tory candidate in the next
general election, he would likely target the traditional centre-right
voters. A large proportion of such voters have turned away from the
Conservative Party, unhappy with Johnson’s leadership, to vote for the
Liberal Democrats. This was evidenced in the recent by-elections
in Tiverton and Honiton. A more centrist Tory government could mean a
more stable, predictable political and economic partner for the EU.
However,
while Sunak may be seeking to portray himself as the more reasonable of
the two, he also subscribes to the policies of the current Conservative
government on migration and ‘taking back control’. Both Truss and Sunak have pledged
to be tough on migration and to continue the UK’s controversial Rwanda
asylum scheme. This signals trouble for the European Convention on Human
Rights and, consequently, the Good Friday Agreement that safeguards
peace in Northern Ireland. Additionally, both have attested to doing
away with all the remaining EU laws in the UK statute book by 2025 at
the latest. Sunak also commended Johnson’s approach to EU–UK relations,
awarding him “a full 10 for delivering Brexit”.
No good choices
Despite
differences between the two candidates, it should be remembered that
Truss and Sunak held the two highest posts in Johnson’s government.
Until last month, both stood by Johnson as he tore through 47 years of
the UK’s amicable relations with its former European partners. When
considering how to engage with the next prime minister across the
Channel come September, neither option look promising.
The EU–UK
relationship has been permanently damaged from the past six years of
the Brexit process. Trust is at an all-time low, and the EU is
understandably reluctant to engage
in any form of policy cooperation with the UK, which it no longer views
as a reliable partner. In the UK, Euroscepticism continues to have a
firm hold on the Conservative Party and its membership. There is little
appetite for a more constructive relationship with the EU. Even Keir Starmer,
leader of the Labour Party, is unwilling to come out in favour of a
re-joining the EU Customs Union and/or Single Market. Brussels is left
wanting for neighbourly relations based on meaningful engagement and
mutual interest in building a lasting and strategic partnership.
In
the short term, any reset of the EU–UK relationship is unlikely,
particularly as the seemingly intractable question of the NIP remains
open. Instead, the European Commission should continue to make clear to
the new UK leader the consequences of acting on the NIPB. An agreement
between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament on the
proposed Regulation
to empower the Commission to take enforcement measures through the WA
and TCA will show that the EU is serious about its willingness to take
retaliatory action.
Looking further ahead, no matter which
candidate wins, they will likely call a general election within a year
to legitimise their leadership. It is unlikely that any agreement on the
NIP will be reached before then. Once again, Brussels remains in
waiting mode until internal British politics settle down and genuine
discussions can resume.
Emily Fitzpatrick is a Junior Policy Analyst in the Europe’s Political Economy programme at the European Policy Centre.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
EPC
© European Policy Centre EPC
Key
Hover over the blue highlighted
text to view the acronym meaning
Hover
over these icons for more information
Comments:
No Comments for this Article