Decades of deindustrialization have hollowed out the UK economy and made it woefully ill-prepared for wartime disruptions. As the financial speculators who funded its current-account deficits turn against the pound, policymakers should consider Keynesian taxes and increasing public investment.
A wartime economy is inherently a shortage economy: because the
government needs to direct resources toward manufacturing guns, less
butter is produced. Because butter must be rationed to make more guns, a
war economy may lead to an inflationary surge that requires
policymakers to cut civilian consumption to reduce excess demand.
In his 1940 pamphlet “
How to Pay for the War,”
John Maynard Keynes famously called for fiscal rebalancing, rather than
budgetary expansion, to accommodate the growing needs of the United
Kingdom’s World War II mobilization effort. To reduce consumption
without driving up inflation, Keynes contended, the government had to
raise taxes on incomes, profits, and wages. “The importance of a war
budget is social,” he asserted. Its purpose is not only to “prevent the
social evils of inflation,” but to do so “in a way which satisfies the
popular sense of social justice whilst maintaining adequate incentives
to work and economy.”
Joseph E. Stiglitz recently applied
this approach to the Ukraine crisis. To ensure the fair distribution of
sacrifice, he argues, governments must impose a windfall-profit tax on
domestic energy suppliers (“war profiteers”). Stiglitz proposes a
“non-linear” energy-pricing system whereby households and companies
could buy 90% of the previous year’s supply at last year’s price.
In
addition, he advocates import-substituting policies such as increasing
domestic food production and greater use of renewables. Stiglitz’s
proposals may work for the United States, which is far less vulnerable
to external disruption than European countries. With a quarter of the global GDP, 14% of world trade, and 60% of the world’s currency reserves, the US can afford belligerence. But the European Union cannot, and the UK even less so.
While the UK has been almost as aggressive as the US in its response to
Russia’s actions, Britain is far less prepared to manage a war economy
than it was in 1940: it makes fewer things, grows less food, and is more
dependent on imports.
The UK is more vulnerable to external shocks than
any major Western power, owing to decades of deindustrialization that
have shrunk its manufacturing sector from 23% of gross value added in 1980 to roughly 10% today. While the UK produced
78% of the food it consumed in 1984, this figure had fallen to 64% by
2019. The British economy’s growing reliance on imported energy has made
it even less self-sufficient. For decades, the financial sector
propped up the UK’s hollowed-out economy.
Financial flows into the City
of London allowed the country to neglect trade and artificially maintain
higher living standards than its export capacity warranted. Britain’s
current-account deficit is now 7% of GDP,
compared to a current-account surplus of 1.3% of GDP in 1980. Until
recently, the British formula had been to finance its external deficit
by attracting speculative capital into London via the financial
industry, which had been deregulated by the “big bang” of 1986.
This was brilliant
but unstable financial engineering: foreigners sent the UK goods that it
otherwise could not afford, Britain sent them sterling in return, and
foreigners used the pound to buy British-domiciled assets. But this was a
short-term fix for the long-term decline of manufacturing, enabling the
UK to live beyond its means without improving its productivity...
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