Northern Ireland will mark 100 years of its existence on the 3rd of May 2021. Meantime the Government of the Republic has launched a radical new policy calling for “A Shared Island”. This new emphasis on SHARING points to a United Ireland as an aspiration rather than a policy.
In parallel, the United Kingdom has voted to leave the European Union in pursuit of a “Global Britain”’.
Change is coming
This
is a heady cocktail of potential change in these islands. For Northern
Ireland, in particular, it heralds a changing relationship within the
United Kingdom even though its citizens are in many cases completely
unaware of the changing circumstances.
For 100 years Northern
Ireland has endured an internal governance which was never recognised by
outsiders as satisfactory. Violence, bigotry, discrimination,
gerrymandering and sectarian conflict have been the hallmarks of too
many of those years. It has seldom been able to govern itself
responsibly, relying frequently on direct rule from Westminster or in
more recent times, having to relinquish major responsibilities to the
governments of Ireland and Britain acting together.
Internal
politics continue to reflect irreconcilable party political philosophies
in the main political groupings despite valiant efforts to eradicate
these extreme positions from a growing but still less than overwhelming
centre ground. Sinn Fein continues the pursuit of rapid Irish unity. The
DUP espouses loyalty to the Queen and adheres to 17th century memories
of religious battles in order to secure the voting power it needs to
maintain its leading position at the ballot box.
But some things remain the same
At
grass roots levels, social polarisation remains alive and well with
around 100 Peace walls still standing in Belfast and in some other towns
such as Derry/Londonderry, Lurgan and Portadown, to separate Catholics
and Protestants from violating each other’s territory. The paramilitary
activity has largely come to an end but the days when the radio and
television news announced “another day, another clean up operation”
following yet more bombings in urban centres, are not so far away.
In
the countryside the role of the Hibernian Hall and the Orange Hall
retain their social significance as dividers of Society and the schools
remain in large part the symbol they always were of religious
segregation although this is in a slow process of change.
Remarkably,
it is still the case that some older Protestants still refer to the
Republic as “The Free State” and seldom if ever go across the Border.
The two Communities, Protestant and Catholic, the two “Traditions” as
they are euphemistically termed, live side by side, seldom intermingling
in local communities and wary of each other’s movements. Of course this
does not apply to anything like the same extent among the professional
and middle classes but even there social divisions are all too evident.
There
is also a feeling of helplessness. The absence of a devolved government
reflects the reality that the elected leaders are still failing to
learn to live with each other, this after 100 years of failure of being
able to do so. There are very few outside influences and voters feel
that they have few opportunities to effect change. A substantial
minority would be happy with permanent direct rule from London and
eschew the world of politics. The awareness of outside events is limited
by a fairly restricted coverage of current affairs. Among the
Protestant population there is a fixation with the prospect of a United
Ireland without much discussion on the pros and cons. It is simply seen
as a threat. It is a form of paranoia engendered in the bad old days of
the de Valera Presidency and his Catholic hegemony. It was later
underpinned by the Irish constitutional claim to the north, never
forgotten by loyalists to this day in spite of the Revocation of the
Constitutional Clauses 2 and 3 in the run up to the Good Friday
Agreement.
Northern Ireland and the outside world
Britain
is seen in Northern Ireland to be a symbol, loved and hated
respectively across the sectarian divide. There is little interest in
the current affairs of England, Wales or Scotland but attention is
always paid to events in London and Dublin. Relations with the south
have certainly changed for the better. The Good Friday Agreement has
given Ireland a right to remain in the forefront of political evolution
in the North. The Peace process is protected by the EU and the Americans
and is generally regarded internationally as a major stepping stone
into the future, even though locally in Northern Ireland it is treated
with a degree of cynicism.
There is an awareness of the European
Union with the public divided in the Brexit vote but nevertheless a
majority for Remain. The United States is a friend for both communities.
Both Protestants and Catholics can relate to American leaders past and
present. The first American Consulate in the world was located in
Belfast to help Presbyterians to emigrate in the mid to late 1800s. The
Commonwealth is talked about but little understood and wrongly believed
to be a British asset of some kind and which some people think the
Republic might rejoin.
Tensions in Northern Ireland
Relations
at the level of Northern Ireland governance remain strained largely as a
result of the irreconcilable philosophies already mentioned. That is
unlikely to change even though the centre ground as represented by
Alliance, the SDLP and elements of the Ulster Unionist Party and the
Greens try hard. Republican and Loyalist mutual loathing is not far
below the surface and to vote to keep an opponent out is often the
preferred option. A vote against Republicanism is a vote in favour of
the D.U.P. A vote against Loyalism is a vote for Sinn Fein. There are
very few policies to discuss and these THEM or US attitudes greatly
limit the influence of moderate parties.
Since the Good Friday
Agreement and until relatively recently, the situation was in reality
one in which Northern Ireland continued to be unable to govern itself
responsibly. The Northern Ireland Executive had ceased to function and
thus the two Governments of Great Britain and Ireland were in fact the
ringmasters. No matter that Northern Ireland was costing the British
Exchequer 11 billion pounds per year, a sum equivalent to the British
contribution to the EU but seldom mentioned in the media or Parliament.
Or that the Irish aspiration of Unity was so conveniently long term as
not to be an immediate problem in the internal politics of the Republic.
It has frequently been claimed somewhat sarcastically by northern
Unionists that the Republic simply couldn’t afford the admittedly high
costs necessary to replace the British annual subvention and that per
capita extrapolation of 11 million pounds per annum from a UK population
of around 67 million to an Irish one of fewer than 5 million would be
unsustainable. Southern commentators swept away these assertions,
claiming that the Europeans and Americans would help in the end. Little
thought was given however, north or south, as to how the northern
population would react to having their pensions propped up by
continental taxpayers or the American dollar or that as the NHS has no
equivalence in the South northern medication would suddenly have be paid
for.
Talk of border referenda and in parallel, obvious British
lack of interest, combine to underline a sense of helplessness among
ordinary people whose interest in politics has been worn away by
fruitless attempts to reconcile. In general Northern Ireland is now in
relative peace, economically well supported by Britain and in no hurry
to disturb relative personal comforts, pensions and a good health
service, while enjoying the peace which has been negotiated principally
by British and Irish Ministers. During that British/Irish led process,
the Northern Ireland Party participants, initially reluctantly but then
gradually, began to see the strategic objective. The DUP objected right
to the end but after a few years came fully on board, their leaders and
Sinn Fein accepting the positions of First and Deputy First Minister,
designations of political equality. Central to this peace has been the
Good Friday Agreement, registered as a Treaty by the United Nations, the
European Union and the US administration. It was and is,
internationally acclaimed as an act of successful diplomacy.
The disturbance of Brexit
Now
the consequences of Brexit are destroying that quiet idyll. The
prospects for a United Ireland are being replaced by the hopes for a
Shared Island. The kaleidoscope has changed the pattern. Northern
Ireland remains in the EU Single market and Customs union in a unique
and so far unfinished negotiation. There will be a border in the Irish
Sea somewhere. Ireland has much to lose. Scotland is unhappy. Wales is
beginning to rumble discontent. London is concerned. But England appears
relatively unperturbed so far. England is turning inwards with the new
phalanx of Red Wall constituencies dominating inter party debate. The
well established north/ south divide, in which the south east is seen to
be the ever winning and centralising force, remains so far intact.
These internal pressures are having the effect of taking political and
governmental focus in Westminster further away from Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland.
The pandemic has also tended to take precedence
over the economic and political future within much of Northern Ireland.
Opportunities of an island wide economic reawakening have yet to emerge.
There will be inevitable consequences of an isolated Britain on the
prospects of much of Northern Ireland business whose main market has
been Great Britain. And at Westminster the new arrangements for Northern
Ireland are being given scant attention only by hard line sovereignty
ideologues and the DUP who have little interest in the relative economic
advantage Northern Ireland might gain in the new all island EU
arrangement. These hardliners rely on the constitutional and sovereignty
based arguments to protect the Brexit objectives of complete
independence from any external collaborations which might sully
sovereign rights.
Momentous changes are in train, the potential
scale of which for Northern Ireland will be unprecedented in the 100
year history of the country.
Changes in the Republic of Ireland
More
deep seated change is on the way elsewhere. This time from the South.
Almost unreported in the British media, the manifesto of the Irish
coalition partners Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Greens, contained
within it a pledge to establish mechanisms to begin a process leading to
what was termed “A shared Island”. At the time the phrase was felt to
mean some change of emphasis away from the time honoured “United
Ireland” mantra towards a softer concept of a “Shared Ireland”. The
policy was clear. The target was indeed “A shared Island”. It means that
the traditional concept of Unity has been replaced, at least for the
time being, by the idea of sharing a space. It implies that the island
will be shared by more than a single philosophy. While it is true that
many outside observers look forward to a United Ireland, the necessary
steps required to achieve it are more complex than is popularly
understood. For example, in a pre Brexit opinion poll, only 27% of
Catholics in Northern Ireland were in favour of a United Ireland. No
such figures are available in the Republic. Unity requires, as a
prerequisite, that referenda are held north and south on the same day
for the process to begin. So the “shared island” policy has taken
precedence.
A special office has been established to begin to
explore how this can be implemented. It clearly represents an invitation
to those in the northern part of the island of Ireland to express
themselves as to their wishes. But so far there has been silence or at
best scepticism. If this process is to get off the ground, an important
role will be played by the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement,
particularly by those relating to the North/South Ministerial Council.
An
arrangement such as this could serve a useful purpose in discussing and
coming to conclusions on policy issues affecting both parts of Ireland
in the European context, with Agriculture being among the most important
and financially significant. Many questions will remain on the table
for the Ministerial Council. Among them will be the nature of the
representation from Northern Ireland when representations are made to
the European Union from Ireland as a whole. At present it is the
Government of the UK which is responsible for the external
representation of Northern Ireland interests. In these new circumstances
the Irish government as an EU member will require some new arrangement
to be agreed which will allow Northern Ireland interests to be
represented at both technical as well as Ministerial and political
levels.
Difficulties for the island of Ireland
In
response to these unprecedented rearrangements, Ireland is expected to
suffer severely from a UK no deal Brexit or a weak free trade agreement.
The Irish Government has strengthened its Consulate in Cardiff, opened a
new one in Glasgow and in Liverpool too. Meetings have been taking
place between Dublin and Edinburgh and are being contemplated between
Dublin and Cardiff. Irish relations with the North are back on track now
that the Northern Executive is again functioning. Meetings of the
North/South Ministerial Council can resume, covering as they do a
significant number of joint economic interests.
As the economic
post-Brexit relations between Ireland, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland are pointing towards closer cooperation, the signals coming from
Whitehall and Westminster are very different. Sovereignty ideologues in
the ranks of Brexit supporters argue in favour of a greater degree of
centralised control from the centre. Such divergent pressures point
towards a weakening rather than a strengthening of the internal United
Kingdom. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland argue for greater
devolution as do more of the English regions too. These entities are
beginning to express a greater willingness to secure more cohesion with
each other economically. There is also a greater degree of cultural
solidarity between any one of the Celtic countries, including Ireland,
than with Anglo Saxon England.
Divisions within the UK
Once
again, Northern Ireland is in the exceptional position of finding
itself split almost evenly between those who believe themselves to be
Irish and Celtic and those who staunchly defend their British identity,
even if the identification on the British side is more with Scotland
than with England. Scotland shows every sign of deep seated
dissatisfaction with current constitutional arrangements and is arguing
for more devolution out of London post Brexit, in contrast to current
government suggestions of strengthening the Union of the UK by more
centralisation rather than loosening it. Scotland, Wales and to some
extent Northern Ireland are pulling against this English led trend.
A
new arrangement, possibly fostered from within the British/Irish
Council could provide the possibilities for both parts of Ireland, Wales
and Scotland to band together in quasi-confederal form as a 14 million
strong economic segment of a reformed British/Irish economic Council,
larger by population than many current EU Members. It would have close
relations with Europe as Ireland and Northern Ireland would be part of
the Single market already. Scotland would decide where its best
interests lie in a referendum and could conceivably use further
devolution in the post-Brexit setting to forge closer economic ties with
Europe without giving up its continuing constitutional position as part
of the UK.
Wales is also divided on the question. The reduction
in the value of the landbridge it provides to Ireland and Europe through
the UK, as a direct consequence of Brexit, could be replaced by shared
economic interests between Wales and Ireland as private sector investors
move out of London to Dublin and other European capitals.
So
Brexit itself and the changes in Northern Ireland which it is expected
to bring, are likely to alter the nature of relationships within and
between these islands. The United Kingdom is likely to become less
united. Scotland seems clear on its ambition to move further down the
path of devolution. It is already opening links with Ireland. Northern
Ireland is not likely to be able to achieve self-government along Welsh
or Scottish lines and its relations with Ireland will alter the
direction of its future economic development within the European Single
market. Wales shows signs of discontent and its proximity to Ireland and
the European Link may provide a stronger gravitational pull than will
London.
A stronger Governmental centralisation from London will
precipitate a reaction from Wales and Scotland and the implementation of
the Irish Protocol will alter the relations between Northern Ireland
and both Great Britain and Ireland at the same time. The British/Irish
Council seems to be the proper place to discuss these matters. But
English concerns may move in a different direction. That would be a
signal for discussions to begin at the invitation of Scotland or Wales
in one of their countries and involve both parts of Ireland in the
process. If that happens, the constitutional implications for the United
Kingdom will be profound and unpredictable.
Federal Trust
© Federal Trust
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