What are the implications for us?
In answering, I want to make five points. First to say that Brexit
has changed our international interests and hence will change our
patterns of European relationships - not necessarily fundamentally, but
significantly. Second, that Brexit means competition - we will be
setting a different path on economic policy. Third, that Brexit was
about democracy - it is a democratic project that is bringing politics
back home. Fourth, that the EU and we have got into a low-equilibrium
somewhat fractious relationship, but that it need not always be like
that - but also that it takes two to fix it. And fifth and finally,
that fixing the very serious problem we have in the Northern Ireland
Protocol is a pre-requisite for getting to a better place.
So let me take these points in turn.
How our European relationships will change
First, self-evidently, our international interests have changed after
Brexit. And so will has our pattern of European relationships.
Most obviously, we no longer have an interest in coalition-building
across the EU to shape EU rules. Relative power within the EU is
important to countries which are members of the EU – and not to those
which aren’t. Of course we will take a strong interest in what happens
within the European Union. We want the Member States of the EU to be
prosperous and successful. We will watch how you legislate and whether
you can develop effective frameworks for new areas of economic and
scientific activity. We look with fascination at debates that in some
way echo ours, like that in Poland, Germany, and seemingly even now
France about the role of the Court of Justice. But we cannot affect
these outcomes except by example; and it would not be correct for us to
try. That makes a huge difference to how we look at things.
In contrast, relationships with countries with which we trade
directly – countries with maritime connections, customs practicalities,
energy connections to us- are going to be particularly important in
future. That means at a minimum that the whole Atlantic littoral,
including Portugal of course, is going to be of renewed significance for
us. That has already been very clear to us in some of the debates
we’ve had since the start of this year.
So too are relationships with countries which are particularly
central to our geopolitical aims and our alliances. That is because -
despite the Indo-Pacific tilt and the broader perspective that Global
Britain must and will have - the hard business of European defence,
backed by resource, deterrence, by sharing of risks remains vital to us.
Indeed that is why we are putting more money into defence, exceeding
the baseline NATO target and reaching 2.3% of GDP this year. So Brexit
will likely strengthen our interest in deep engagement with the
traditionally more transatlanticist countries like Portugal, but also
the countries in central and Eastern Europe that bear the direct burden
of the pressure from Russia - which is why we take a particular interest
in working with the Baltics, with Poland, and in new concepts like the
Three Seas initiative.
It also means that, despite the very visible current difficulties, we
will always look to have a constructive and productive relationship
with France - Indeed, one of the reasons why we have such strong
military ties with France is, I think in part, that we both hold a view
that the defence of Europe also depends on our willingness to act beyond
the Continent of Europe itself.
Brexit means healthy competition
There is of course no contradiction between these deep relationships
based on fundamental interests and pursuing our own prosperity in our
own way. And that is the second point I want to make. I said just now
that our influence on the EU now comes through the power of example, and
hence also through a healthy degree of competition. Brexit is about
doing things differently - not for the sake of it but because it suits
us and because it creates a greater variety of alternative futures.
History shows us that it is genuine competition - regulatory and
commercial - between states which has typically been the most reliable
driver of innovation and progress. That’s why what some people call I
quote “hard Brexit” - in its original sense of leaving the EU customs
union and single market - was essential. It was the only form of Brexit
that allowed us freedom to experiment and freedom to act.
This is already happening. And you can see some themes emerging
reflecting our different policy preferences in the UK.
One is our renewed emphasis on the modern use of science, on the
benefits of research - we have set up our own pure research
organisation, our ARIA like the US ARPA - and on a proportionate
approach to risk. We recognise that zero risk systems are a myth and in
fact sometimes totemise particular aspects of broad societal
challenges. So on COVID, there is a balance between opening up and
managing the health burden, and we have now made a set of choices now,
which I believe we can and must stick to, which recognise the risks to
society of not opening up. Indeed arguably Britain, or at least
England, is now the free-est country in Europe in this respect. We are
also going to get moving on areas like cyber, like artificial
intelligence and gene editing. On border controls, even when they are
fully in place, we are never going to adopt the same levels of checks
and controls required by EU systems because we don’t believe the level
of risk requires them.
Another strand is that you can see a more active state than we have
got used to in Britain in recent years, but always working within the
confines of a liberal market economy. To take just two examples, we are
developing a subsidy policy that is less process-driven and
bureaucratic than the EU’s, more tailored to the needs of the UK
economy. The state is creating freeports - areas where there are tax
reductions aimed at job creation.
And finally we are actively looking at areas where we have inherited EU
rules that we regard as unnecessarily complex, bureaucratic, or just
unsuited to our present and future needs - a new agriculture support
system that is more suited to our climate than the vasty fields of
France; new procurement rules; or, since we can see the way the debate
is going in the EU on equivalence, reforms to many financial services
regulations.
In Britain people voted for change. That’s what they expect and that’s
what’s happening.
Brexit is about democracy
So to my third point: it’s about democracy. Too often the debate
about Brexit is technocratic - the merits of one kind of trading
arrangement over another, the merits of one visa arrangement over
another. Those are important issues, if now largely settled. But the
fundamental element of the Brexit project is about democracy - to bring
home political debates, to allow us to set our own ways of doing things
in our own way, to open up the field of political and economic
possibility.
This is fundamental. In most EU member states many important things
can’t be changed through elections - trade policy, monetary policy,
fiscal policy, important elements of immigration policy, indeed some
important aspects of industrial policy. That is your choice (and it is
not for us to question), but our choice is that our electors should be
able to debate, and change, policy in elections. Those debates are now
happening for example there have been vigorous debates about the
direction of the UK’s independent trade policy, with Parliament bringing
different viewpoints to the table. We have a very lively discussion of
migration policy, freed by the debate over free movement to offer
unprecedented immigration and visa schemes to tens of thousands from
Hong Kong and, more recently, Afghanistan. And indeed our whole
levelling up programme is about the trade-offs between different kinds
of economic policy in different parts of the country.
That’s why I don’t see anything wrong with Brexit being described as a
populist policy. If populism means doing what people want –
challenging a technocratic consensus – then I am all for it. To suggest
that there is something wrong in people deciding things for themselves
is somewhat disreputable, even disrespectful to the British people and
our democracy.
We have always said “taking back control” is about the ability to
make sovereign choices across a range of different areas of national
life, not the specifics of those choices. I personally will argue as
strongly as I can that free market capitalism, low taxes, free speech,
and the maximum possible amount of economic and political freedom for
individuals, are the best choices we could make as a country. But now we
have to win those arguments and persuade people, not just write them
into a Treaty or a Convention and expect people to put up with them.
Indeed it was arguably the profound sense of democratic estrangement
which accompanied the signing of the EU’s most recent Treaty here in
Lisbon - felt acutely although by no means exclusively in Britain -
which made the UK’s path towards exiting the European Union almost an
inevitability.
That’s what I see going on in Britain – genuine, far-reaching
political argument - sometimes turbulent but ultimately healthy for our
political debate.
What, then, is to be said about the fourth point I want to make - where does this leave our relationship with the EU?
Can we fix the UK / EU relationship?
On the one hand, despite all the current difficulties, there has been
some good cooperation between us, often at a practical level. We work
well together on sanctions policy for example and I am sure we could do
more together on foreign policy and defence. Customs officials in the
member states generally work effectively with ours and are pragmatically
keeping goods moving. We have comparable climate goals with net zero
in mind - though there is a discussion coming on the EU’s plans on
CBAMs.
But there should be much more to it. The EU is obviously developing
as a force in international affairs beyond the traditional areas of
economic policy - navigating the rise of China and India and the
changing roles of Russia and, indeed, the United States. As it does so,
just offshore is a former member with the fifth largest economy in the
world with some of the best universities, a seat on the P5, biggest
defence spender in Europe and a nuclear power, which shares the same
fundamental liberal democratic values and the deepest of ties between
peoples and cultures. That fact, that reality can be handled in
different ways by the Union.
Competition between us, as I said, is likely to be helpful to us
both. But alienation, I think, would be a serious historical error.
Strategic autonomy - if indeed it can be achieved - does not need to
mean aloofness. The bumpiness of the last four years cannot be doubted
but the prize for entering into a new era of relations cannot be doubted
either.
I am aware obviously of the many criticisms that have been made of
the UK in these past few years. Yet, viewed from our perspective, we
look at the EU and see an organisation that seems to want to get back to
constructive working together. For example we have seen:
- Extreme tensions over the EU’s vaccine ban earlier this year.
- A block on our entry to Horizon (and of course earlier a refusal to allow us into Galileo)
- Threats to our energy supplies through the interconnectors
- A needless ban on the import of most shellfish to the EU, causing significant pain to our fishermen; and
- Knee-jerk resort to legal action on Northern Ireland
And overall, we are constantly faced with generalised accusations
that can’t be trusted and are not a reasonable international actor.
So, with all this in mind, we can’t help taking it with a pinch of
salt when we are told that the EU has stopped thinking about the UK and
it is we who are still obsessed with Brexit. Actually we are not -
there is no electoral dividend in endlessly talking about Brexit - quite
the reverse. That is why the PM barely mentioned it in his Party
Conference speech last week. What we do see, instead, is an
organisation that doesn’t always look like it wants us to succeed.
We didn’t want it to be like this. We just want friendly relations,
free trade, and the chance to do things our own way, all within the
framework of a meaningful and robust Western alliance. With this in
mind, I do urge you to look at the image you are presenting to us. If
there is a trust problem, as we are constantly told there is, it is not
the responsibility of only one party. At some point we must both try
to raise our eyes to the horizon, look at the possibilities for better
relations, and try to help each other solve problems, not create them.
Fixing the Northern Ireland Protocol
Which brings me to my fifth and final point, and the biggest current
problem - the Northern Ireland Protocol. It is the biggest source of
mistrust between us and for all kinds of reasons, we need to fix it.
I recognise that is not easy. The history here matters. I do
understand why the EU feels it is difficult to come back to an agreement
reached only two years ago, though obviously that in itself is far from
unusual in international relations. Equally, there is a widespread
feeling in the UK that the EU did try to use Northern Ireland to
encourage UK political forces to reverse the referendum result or at
least to keep us closely aligned with the EU; and, moreover, that the
Protocol represents a moment of EU overreach when the UK’s negotiating
hand was tied, and therefore cannot reasonably last in its current form.
Whether or not you agree with either analysis - the facts on the
ground are what matter above all. Maybe there is a world in which the
Protocol could have worked, more sensitively implemented. But the
situation has now moved on. We now face a very serious situation. The
Protocol is not working. It has completely lost consent in one
community in Northern Ireland. It is not doing the thing it was set up
to do – protect the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. In fact it is doing
the opposite. It has to change.
No-one here is expert in Northern Ireland and we are not asking you
to be. We are asking you, the EU, to work with us to help us manage the
delicate balance in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and not to
disrupt it - to reflect the concerns of everyone in Northern Ireland,
from all sides of the political spectrum, and to make sure that the
peace process is not undermined.
The key feature of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement is balance -
between different communities and between their links with the rest of
the UK and the Republic of Ireland. That balance is being shredded by
the way this Protocol is working. The fundamental difficulty is that we
are being asked to run a full-scale external boundary of the EU through
the centre of our country, to apply EU law without consent in part of
it, and to have any dispute on these arrangements settled in the court
of one of the parties. The way this is happening is disrupting ordinary
lives, damaging large and small businesses, and causing serious
turbulence to the institutions of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement
within Northern Ireland.
I remind you of Burke’s words I quoted at the beginning and I quote
again: “politics should be adjusted, not to human reasonings, but to
human nature …people must be governed in a manner agreeable to their
temper and disposition.” That is why we need to move on from this,
once and for all. That simply won’t happen without significant change
to the existing Protocol.
We put forward proposals to fix things in July. They are less than
many in Northern Ireland would like to see. They do not sweep away the
Protocol. They work with the grain of it. They do not require
infrastructure or checks at the international border between Northern
Ireland and Ireland – no-one wants this and we have always opposed it.
They keep Irish Sea trade arrangements for goods going into Ireland and
we accept a responsibility to implement EU rules for those goods. They
allow both UK and EU-standard goods to circulate in Northern Ireland.
They protect the EU single market - not that it is in any way under
threat. But, crucially, they would allow goods to circulate virtually
freely between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK - something that
every other country in the world takes for granted.
We are now heading to a crucial few weeks. We await the proposals
coming tomorrow from Maroš Šefčovič and the Commission in response to
our ideas. To be clear, we will be really ready to discuss them –
whatever they say – and we will obviously consider them seriously,
fully, and positively. But - I repeat - if we are going to get to a
solution we must, collectively, deliver significant change. We need the
EU to show the same ambition and willingness - to tackle the fundamental
issues at the heart of the Protocol head on.
That’s why I am sharing with the Commission today a new legal text -
the text of an amended Protocol, reflecting the proposals in our Command
Paper, and supporting, not undermining, the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreement.
I want to comment briefly on a couple of aspects of this text.
First, this new Protocol is forward-looking. The original Protocol
was agreed at a time when we didn’t know whether there would be a trade
agreement between us and the EU. Many of the most unusual and
disproportionate provisions were agreed precisely because we didn’t know
what the shape of our future trading relationship was going to be. In
the face of uncertainty the original Protocol defaulted to excessive
rigidity - rigidity which is now needlessly harming Northern Ireland.
We now know have a very far-reaching agreement between us, one which
will regulate all aspects of our trade in the future. So it makes sense
to situate the new agreement in that new trading context and bring it
in line with those arrangements – they are after all the most
significant signed by each party to date.
Second, our proposal looks more like a normal Treaty in the way it is
governed, with international arbitration instead of a system of EU law
ultimately policed in the court of one of the parties, the European
Court of Justice. The Commission have been too quick to dismiss
governance as a side issue. The reality is the opposite. The role of the
European Court of Justice and the EU institutions in Northern Ireland
create a situation where there appears to be no discretion about how
provisions in the Protocol are implemented. The Commission’s decision to
launch infraction proceedings against us earlier this year at the very
first sign of disagreement shows why these arrangements won’t work in
practice.
But it is not just about the Court. It is about the system of which
the Court is the apex - the system which means the EU can make laws
which apply in Northern Ireland without any kind of democratic scrutiny
or discussion. Even now, as the EU considers possible solutions, there
is an air of it saying “we have decided what’s best for you, and will
now implement it.”
None of this we can now see will work as part of a durable
settlement. Indeed without new arrangements in this area no Protocol
will ever have the support across Northern Ireland it needs to survive.
So I urge Portugal and everyone in the EU to look carefully at what
we are proposing as we will look carefully at what the EU proposes. I
ask everyone listening to me today to think again about the positions
taken so far. If we can put the Protocol on a durable footing, we have
the opportunity to move past the difficulties of the past year. We have
a short, but real, opportunity to put in place a new arrangement, to
defuse the political crisis that is brewing, both in Northern Ireland
and between us. If we can work on that then of course other things
become possible too. Other significant problems in the relationship, of
interest to both sides, might become resolvable. We would have a
chance to move forward to a new, and better, equilibrium.
The Protocol itself envisages that it can be superseded by future
agreements in Article 13(8). Given the experience we now have, it is
clear that it must.
What does it cost the EU to put a new Protocol in place? As it seems
to us, very little. There is no threat to the single market from what
we are proposing. We are not asking to change arrangements within the
EU in any way. We are not seeking to generalise special rules for
Northern Ireland to any other aspect of our relationship.
For the EU now to say that the Protocol - drawn up in extreme haste in a
time of great uncertainty - can never be improved upon, when it is so
self-evidently causing such significant problems, would be a historic
misjudgement. It would be to prioritise EU internal processes over
relieving turbulence in Northern Ireland; to say that societal
disruption and trade distortion can be disregarded as mere background
noise; perhaps even that they are an acceptable price for Northern
Ireland to pay to demonstrate that “Brexit has not worked”.
To insist on this route would be to do a great disservice to Northern
Ireland - and not recognise the process of iterative improvement that
has kept the balance and sustained the peace process in Northern Ireland
over the past decades.
Of course you can insist on this route. But if you do, you must
remember that it is this government that governs Northern Ireland as it
does the rest of the UK. Northern Ireland is not EU territory. It is
our responsibility to safeguard peace and prosperity in Northern
Ireland, and that may include using Article 16 if necessary. We would
not go down this road gratuitously or with any particular pleasure.
But, as Burke famously commented in his pamphlet “there is however a
limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue”. It is our
fundamental responsibility to safeguard peace and prosperity in Northern
Ireland, and that is why we cannot rest until the situation has been
addressed.
The Protocol itself is clear that it respects the “essential state
functions” of the UK. It does not create some kind of co-dominion or
co-responsibility with the EU in Northern Ireland. It doesn’t allow the
EU to develop its own aspirations for Northern Ireland as if it were a
member state, for example to decide that it is in Northern Ireland’s own
interests to stay subject to the rules of the single market for goods,
whatever the UK Government may think.
The Protocol is there to support the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.
The A16 safeguards are there to deal with the situation if it ceases to
do so. We will always act with that in mind.
So I repeat, to conclude- let us both be ambitious and agree a better
way forward. Let’s agree arrangements which we will both implement and
which can in fact be implemented, because they command acceptance and
respect across Northern Ireland.
In short, let’s try to get back to normal. With some effort of will,
we could still, despite all the problems, be in a position where the
poison is drawn from this issue entirely and it is removed from the
diplomatic top table once and for all. I personally would certainly be
happy, if I could, to come here next year and talk about a new age of
cooperation in which the word “Protocol” never appears.
Let me return one last time to Burke’s pamphlet. He is describing
the Government’s position at a previous time of deep division in British
politics, in fact over policy on America, but his words have resonance
to all of us today:
“A diversity of opinion upon almost every principle of politics had
indeed drawn a strong line of separation between them and some others.
However, they were desirous not to extend [it] by unnecessary
bitterness; they wished to prevent a difference of opinion …from
festering into rancorous and incurable hostility. Accordingly they
endeavoured that all past controversies should be forgotten.”
I think we should act in that spirit. The Western alliance has got
too many global challenges to spend time on internal disputes. We face
the same problems. We all need to stick together if we are to keep
counting for something in the rest of the world and making a difference.
That is what we will work for and we hope it can be a genuinely common
effort.
Cabinet Office
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