In a guest blog for the IfG, Sir Jonathan Jones QC, the former head of the Government Legal Department, assesses how the government received legal advice on the Northern Ireland protocol – and finds its published legal position far from persuasive
In all the drama of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill
published by the government on 13 June, there has been an interesting
sub-plot around the question of what legal advice was given on the bill,
and by whom.
The government gets its legal advice from a variety of sources. At the
apex of the system is the attorney general, who is the government’s
chief legal adviser, supported by the solicitor general and the advocate
general for Scotland (collectively “the law officers”).
Obviously the law officers personally can deal with only a small
fraction of the many legal issues facing government – typically, the
most complex, controversial or sensitive ones. There is this
long-standing rule, contained in the ministerial code:
The fact that the law officers have advised or have not advised and
the content of their advice must not be disclosed outside government
without their authority.
So we don’t normally know whether the law officers have advised on a
particular matter, let alone the content of their advice. In this case
however it was reported [1] that
the attorney general, Suella Braverman, had advised that the proposed
Northern Ireland Protocol Bill was compatible with international law. It
is also the case that the same Attorney General took a public role in
defending the government’s previous bid to override the protocol, in the
2020 Internal Market Bill. There can be no doubt that she will have
advised on the current bill.
But the Attorney General has access to advice from a variety of other
sources. These include lawyers in the Government Legal Department,
headed by the Treasury Solicitor, and other government legal teams
including the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and the
Attorney General’s Office itself. In addition, Parliamentary Counsel are
the experts who draft and advise on government bills. It is also quite
usual for the Attorney to consult external counsel, whether First
Treasury Counsel (FTC) [2],
or a member of one of the government’s panels of counsel, or (less
often) a specialist barrister who is not on any of the panels. Sir James
Eadie QC has been FTC since 2009 and is one of the most experienced and
respected members of the Bar. It was reported [3] that
James Eadie had been asked to advise on the NI Protocol Bill – but not
(as discussed below) on its compatibility with international law, on
which separate advice had already been obtained from other external
lawyers.
Again this is not, in itself, so very unusual. Different lawyers might
be asked to advise on different aspects of a complex legal issue,
depending on their particular areas of specialism. The government does
not usually name individual lawyers from whom advice has been sought
(though there is no rule against doing so, as there is under the
ministerial code in relation to the law officers).
In this case though, things got messy.
It has always been clear that there were – to put it no higher –
serious doubts about whether the government’s plans to override the
protocol were compatible with the UK’s international law obligations
under the EU Withdrawal Agreement. Indeed, last time round the Northern
Ireland secretary, Brandon Lewis, acknowledged that the relevant
provisions of the Internal Market Bill did breach international law in
“limited and specific ways”.
This time the government has issued a statement [4]
asserting that its proposals are consistent with international law. It
has not published the underlying legal advice. However, from the earlier
leak it appears that the government had consulted an unknown number of
unnamed legal advisers on the international law position. James Eadie
was then asked to advise not on the international law aspects, but to
assume there were respectable arguments that the proposals were
compatible with international law. My guess is that Eadie was asked to
advise on whether the proposals in the bill met the government’s policy
aims as a matter of UK domestic law, and (perhaps) whether they would
survive challenge in the UK courts. However, according to the leak,
while nominally accepting that assumption, Eadie inconveniently went on
to say he found the argument of one of the other lawyers "considerably
easier to follow and more convincing" – to the effect that it would be
"very difficult" for the UK to argue it is not "breaching international
law".
What about the substance of the government’s published legal position?
It accepts, as it must, that the new bill involves the “non-performance
of [the UK’s] international obligations”: indeed the bill overrides (or
allows ministers to override) almost every aspect of the protocol. The
government justifies this on the basis of the international law doctrine
of “necessity” – that “the legislation is currently the only way to
provide the means to alleviate the socio-political conditions” in “the
challenging, complex and unique circumstances of Northern Ireland”.
Most legal commentators are distinctly unpersuaded by this explanation.
From the sound of it, James Eadie and at least one of the government’s
other lawyers also had their doubts. I have politely described the
argument as “weak”, perhaps more bluntly as “hopeless”.
The concept of “necessity” in international law is an extremely high
test – the government accepts it “can only be exceptionally invoked”. It
applies only where a state must act to safeguard its essential
interests against “grave and imminent peril”.
For a start, it must be inherently implausible that an agreement
willingly entered into only in 2020, at what the prime minister
described as a “fantastic moment”, is already proving such a
catastrophic disaster as to represent “grave peril” to the country. The
government statement sets out no evidence for such an extreme
conclusion. Secondly, there is no explanation for why legislation on the
scale of the Bill is “necessary” to deal with the situation – why
lesser measures have not been attempted first, including Article 16 of
the protocol which allows either the EU or UK to take certain “safeguard
measures” if the application of the protocol leads to “serious
economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to
persist, or to diversion of trade”. How can it possibly be true, for
example, that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over
aspects of the protocol represents a “grave and imminent peril” to the
UK? Finally, the bill – assuming it is eventually passed – is likely to
take many months to get through Parliament. If the UK really did face
imminent peril, you might think the government would need to deal with
it more quickly than that....
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