Brexit might not be as integral to the political identities of Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak as it has been for Boris Johnson. Still, the two leadership candidates are closely linked to Johnson’s administration. Even with new leadership, a radical reset of EU–UK relations is unlikely.
      
    
    
      Following Boris Johnson’s 
announcement on 7 July that he would resign as UK prime minister, 
Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and former Chancellor Rishi Sunak are the 
two remaining candidates vying to be the Conservative Party’s next 
leader and, consequently, his successor. In the past months, there was a
 consensus in Brussels that for as long as Johnson remains in office, 
there is little potential for repairing the deeply fractured EU–UK 
relationship. Now that the end is in sight, does a new prime minister 
offer any hope of repairing the damage Johnson will leave behind? 
EU–UK relations take a backseat 
Antagonistic
 relations with the EU have been a cornerstone of Johnson’s popularity. 
His star rose as a leader of the Vote Leave campaign during the 2016 
Brexit referendum, and he won the 2019 general election on a promise to Get Brexit Done.
 While prime minister, Johnson had a habit of opting for inflammatory 
clashes with the EU when he needed to reinvigorate his Conservative 
base. 
Truss’ and Sunak’s political profiles are not as closely 
linked to Brexit. There has been limited to no discussion in the recent 
leadership debates on how they would approach relations with the EU. 
Instead, the focus of this leadership contest centres on domestic issues
 like tax cuts and the cost-of-living crisis. 
This omission of 
the EU from the debate is not necessarily a positive. Despite Brexit’s 
increasingly obvious negative implications for the UK economy – it is 
expected to be the G7’s slowest growing economy in
 2023 –, neither candidate has put forward any meaningful strategy for a
 new, more constructive approach to EU–UK relations. In fact, both seem 
to implicitly agree with Johnson’s handling of the relationship. Johnson
 was obliged to resign as prime minister due to his (mis)handling of an 
internal Tory scandal, following on from Partygate. His handling of the 
EU–UK relationship, or the heavily criticised Northern Ireland Protocol Bill (NIPB), was not at issue.
Truss embodies continuity
Indeed,
 Truss, the frontrunner in the leadership contest, never resigned from 
her post as foreign secretary and continues to serve in Johnson’s 
caretaker government. Formerly a Remainer, she has worked hard the past 
year to demonstrate her ‘Brexit credentials’. Truss took over as the 
UK’s lead Brexit negotiator in December 2021.
 While an initial effort was made to thaw relations with the EU 
regarding the Northern Ireland Protocol (NIP), Truss’ introduction of 
the NIPB in June has won her few friends in Brussels, where it is viewed
 as a violation of international law. 
Truss consulted
 with the Conservative Party’s European Research Group (ERG) before 
bringing forward the bill, and many in Brussels believe that her 
motivation in progressing the legislation was to solidify her chances as
 Johnson’s successor among the Eurosceptic factions of the Conservative 
Party. 
Reliant on the Conservative Party’s Eurosceptic wing, it 
is unlikely that Truss could roll back on her hard-line approach if she 
becomes prime minister. This will further damage the EU–UK relationship,
 as the EU has warned of retaliatory measures
 should the NIPB become law. More Johnsonian tactics of brinksmanship 
could be expected as a trade war with the EU becomes more likely. 
Additionally, by introducing the bill, Truss seriously damaged her 
credibility with her European counterpart, Commission Vice-President 
Maroš Šefčovič. Any rebuilding of relations would be difficult under 
Truss’ leadership.
Prospect for a reset under Sunak?
Former
 Chancellor Sunak has maintained a greater distance from the toxic NIP 
dispute. Despite campaigning for the UK to leave the EU in 2016, Sunak 
has not made Euroscepticism a cornerstone of his leadership campaign to 
the same extent as Johnson and now Truss. As such, there could be scope 
to rebuild relations under a Sunak premiership. Reportedly,
 while chancellor, Sunak opposed the NIPB and expressed concerns 
regarding the cost of a potential EU–UK trade war on the UK economy. He did not vote on the bill on its second reading and has been referred to as the “least worse” candidate by Member of Parliament Stephen Farry of Northern Ireland’s Alliance Party. 
Sunak’s
 minimal interactions with his EU counterparts mean that, if selected to
 be prime minister, EU–UK relations will begin from a more neutral 
starting point. Given that he seems less interested in finding an 
immediate solution on the NIP, space could be created to de-dramatise 
and de-politicise the relationship. If the relations were relegated to a
 ‘third-order’ or bureaucratic level, managed within the formal 
governance structures of the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), EU and UK officials might be able to 
find joint solutions to many of the current technical problems regarding
 the Protocol and other trade issues. 
Additionally, Sunak is 
less reliant on the support of the far-right, Eurosceptic wing of the 
Conservative Party. If he were to run as the Tory candidate in the next 
general election, he would likely target the traditional centre-right 
voters. A large proportion of such voters have turned away from the 
Conservative Party, unhappy with Johnson’s leadership, to vote for the 
Liberal Democrats. This was evidenced in the recent by-elections
 in Tiverton and Honiton. A more centrist Tory government could mean a 
more stable, predictable political and economic partner for the EU.
However,
 while Sunak may be seeking to portray himself as the more reasonable of
 the two, he also subscribes to the policies of the current Conservative
 government on migration and ‘taking back control’. Both Truss and Sunak have pledged
 to be tough on migration and to continue the UK’s controversial Rwanda 
asylum scheme. This signals trouble for the European Convention on Human
 Rights and, consequently, the Good Friday Agreement that safeguards 
peace in Northern Ireland. Additionally, both have attested to doing 
away with all the remaining EU laws in the UK statute book by 2025 at 
the latest. Sunak also commended Johnson’s approach to EU–UK relations, 
awarding him “a full 10 for delivering Brexit”. 
No good choices
Despite
 differences between the two candidates, it should be remembered that 
Truss and Sunak held the two highest posts in Johnson’s government. 
Until last month, both stood by Johnson as he tore through 47 years of 
the UK’s amicable relations with its former European partners. When 
considering how to engage with the next prime minister across the 
Channel come September, neither option look promising. 
The EU–UK
 relationship has been permanently damaged from the past six years of 
the Brexit process. Trust is at an all-time low, and the EU is 
understandably reluctant to engage
 in any form of policy cooperation with the UK, which it no longer views
 as a reliable partner. In the UK, Euroscepticism continues to have a 
firm hold on the Conservative Party and its membership. There is little 
appetite for a more constructive relationship with the EU. Even Keir Starmer,
 leader of the Labour Party, is unwilling to come out in favour of a 
re-joining the EU Customs Union and/or Single Market. Brussels is left 
wanting for neighbourly relations based on meaningful engagement and 
mutual interest in building a lasting and strategic partnership. 
In
 the short term, any reset of the EU–UK relationship is unlikely, 
particularly as the seemingly intractable question of the NIP remains 
open. Instead, the European Commission should continue to make clear to 
the new UK leader the consequences of acting on the NIPB. An agreement 
between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament on the 
proposed Regulation
 to empower the Commission to take enforcement measures through the WA 
and TCA will show that the EU is serious about its willingness to take 
retaliatory action. 
Looking further ahead, no matter which 
candidate wins, they will likely call a general election within a year 
to legitimise their leadership. It is unlikely that any agreement on the
 NIP will be reached before then. Once again, Brussels remains in 
waiting mode until internal British politics settle down and genuine 
discussions can resume.
Emily Fitzpatrick is a Junior Policy Analyst in the Europe’s Political Economy programme at the European Policy Centre.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre.
EPC
      
      
      
      
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