CEPR eBook reported new academic research on the economic impacts of Brexit, particularly on trade and migration. This column explores ... emerging findings are consistent with economists’ pre-Brexit predictions; and what possible explanations there are for the divergences observed so far. 
      
    
    
      Leaving the EU Single Market – not, formally, a necessary consequence
 of Brexit, but in practice one that became inevitable very shortly 
after the Brexit referendum – meant, by definition, increased barriers 
to trade in goods and services between the UK and the EU (and the 
European Economic Area), and the end of free movement of people in both 
directions.  It also – again, not as a necessary consequence, but as 
part of the clear political commitments of the Vote Leave campaign and 
the post-2016 Conservative government – entailed a reduction of such 
barriers between the UK and the rest of the world (e.g. Baldwin 2016)
In other words, just as joining the EU (and the subsequent deepening 
of European integration) led both to trade creation – as trade between 
the UK and other Member States increased – and trade diversion – as UK 
trade with the rest of the world decreased (particularly, in the years 
following entry, trade with some Commonwealth countries) – Brexit should
 lead to the opposite: call it ‘trade destruction’ and ‘trade 
reversion’.  Similarly with migration, although in this case it was the 
accession of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to the EU in 
2004 that led to a substantial reorientation of UK inward migration 
flows away from former Commonwealth countries and towards the EU (Portes
 2015).
It follows that in theory, the overall impact on the volume of UK 
trade and migration from Brexit is ambiguous. However, economists were 
almost unanimous that it would in practice be negative. For trade, the 
logic was simple.  The EU is by far the UK’s largest trading partner, 
accounting for (at the time of the referendum) about half of all UK 
trade; and the EU Single Market is an area of deep economic integration,
 much more than just a free trade area.  Empirical estimates of the 
impact of Brexit on trade therefore suggested that reduced trade 
barriers to the rest of the world post-Brexit, while beneficial, would 
do little to outweigh the negative impacts of increased barriers with 
the EU (e.g. Dhringra et al. 2016). 
Modelling by the UK government (DExEU 2018) estimated that, assuming a
 free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU that provided for tariff- and 
quota-free trade with the EU, but little or no regulatory convergence, 
meaning large increases in non-tariff barriers – which proved to be 
broadly the eventual outcome under the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement – UK-EU trade volumes would fall by about 25%. Meanwhile, even
 under optimistic assumptions about possible FTAs with non-EU countries 
including the US, China and India, trade volumes with the rest of the 
world would only increase by about 5%, resulting in a net fall of about 
10%.  Consistent with this, the UK Office of Budget Responsibility, 
based on a comprehensive review of the literature, forecast a fall in UK
 trade intensity of about 15% (OBR 2018).
The consensus on immigration was remarkably similar: that Brexit 
would lead directly, through the end of free movement, to a sharp fall 
in immigration from the EU, only partially offset by discretionary 
liberalisation to the rest of the world.  Forte and Portes (2019) 
estimated that EU migration would fall by about 70%, while non-EU 
migration might increase by about 10%. However, this predated the fall 
of Theresa May, who had planned to implement a very restrictive new 
immigration system; the Johnson administration switched tack.  Revised 
estimates (UK in a Changing Europe 2019) suggested that while EU 
migration would still decrease very considerably, perhaps by 60%, non-EU
 migration might increase by about 30%. The official Home Office impact 
assessment came to a similar conclusion (Home Office 2021)....
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