04 October 2024

What UK think's Curtice: Where do those who voted Labour in July stand on Brexit?

One of the strategic objectives Sir Keir Starmer set for his party on becoming leader in spring 2020 was to reconnect with those of the party’s former supporters who had voted Leave in 2016 and had subsequently switched to the Conservatives in 2019. In this blog we use the data from the first poll to be conducted by Redfield & Wilton strategies for UK in a Changing Europe since the election in July to assess where those who voted Labour stand on Brexit, and whether this has, indeed, changed since 2019.

There is, after all, one key reason why we might anticipate that Labour were not in fact particularly successful in winning over those who believe in Brexit – the party’s overall share of the vote in 2024 was little different from that in 2019. Across Britain as a whole its support rose by a little less than two points, and most of that was accounted for by a strong advance in Scotland. The party’s share of the vote increased by just half a point in England and actually fell back by nearly four points in Wales.

Still, although Labour won much the same share of the vote as in 2019, that does not necessarily mean the same people voted for it on both occasions. Perhaps those who switched to the party in 2024 were more likely to be supporters of Brexit, while those who had backed the party in 2019 but did not do so again this time around were more likely to be those who would prefer to be inside the EU.

In fact, Redfield & Wilton’s data, collected in August, suggest there was at most only a small change since 2019 in the balance of opinion on the EU among Labour voters. Leaving aside those who do not say how they would vote in another EU referendum, 74% of those who voted Labour in 2019 say they would now vote to rejoin the EU. In July the equivalent figure was 72%.

However, this stability does not arise because those who switched to Labour in 2024 (which include those who were too young to vote in 2019) were just as keen on EU membership as those who voted Labour in both 2019 and 2024. Whereas 75% of Labour ‘loyalists’ would currently vote to rejoin the EU, the equivalent figure among the party’s new ‘recruits’ was a more modest 64%.

But given that Labour’s overall share of the vote was much the same in 2024 as in 2019, for every voter that the party gained in July there was (more or less) another that it lost. And this group was almost as pro-EU as those who remained loyal to the party. In short, Labour’s vote was a little less pro-EU in July than in 2019 because it lost ground a little more heavily among those who support rejoining the EU than it gained among those who would vote to stay out.

That said, there is a paradox in the data. Despite their pro-EU leanings, as Table 1 shows, those who were ‘loyal’ to Labour in July were more likely than both the (less pro-EU) ‘recruits’ to the party’s ranks and the (just as pro-EU) ‘defectors’ to say that being outside the EU has had a positive impact on the UK. For example, as many as 40% of ‘loyalists’ say the effect of being outside the UK to date has been positive, compared with 35% of recruits and just 28% of defectors. Loyalists are also somewhat more likely to believe that Britain’s economy is stronger as a result of the UK having left the EU. Although they say they would vote to rejoin the EU if another referendum were to be held, apparently many loyalists are in fact relatively sanguine about being outside the EU....

 more at UK in  Chamging EU

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