The aim of this article is to assess five years - in terms of where we are from an economic, foreign policy and security point of view and to analyse the steps taken by the European Union to become a full-fledged player on the international scene.
France has not held the presidency of the Council of the European Union
for thirteen years. It has held it since 1 January 2022 for a period of
six months. This provides an opportunity for the French Head of State to
give his vision of geopolitical issues. It also provides an opportunity
to explain the concepts of European sovereignty, power, autonomy and
strategic responsibility. France, with Germany and the support of the
institutions, has played an essential - albeit contested - role in
promoting a more political Europe over the past five years (Sorbonne
speech in 2017).
Failures, but also lessons to be taken from no one
A more geopolitical European Union? Who will accept or believe in it?
For us Europeans, the challenges are mounting, within our borders where
the rule of law is being challenged, on our immediate periphery where
the sabre rattling reminds us that history is repeating itself. And
further afield - in Syria, Libya, the Sahel, the Middle East,
Afghanistan - what have we achieved in the last twenty years, what
remains of our negotiations, our interventions, the hundreds of millions
invested in peace and security? What is left, if not the people who are
fleeing their countries believing in a European dream that has never
existed, a dream exploited by smugglers and autocratic regimes, a dream
that is turning into a nightmare before they even set foot on the
European continent. What has the European Union's foreign and security
policy achieved?
This is a real question, but it is not the only one, nor perhaps even
the right one. All these crises have multiple causes. What must be
assessed here is not simply Europe's failure to bring about or protect
democracy within its borders and beyond. It also concerns, beyond
Europe, the failure of the great powers in general and of the
multilateral system in particular, which have been unable, or unwilling,
to support the necessary transitions taking place in Asia, the Maghreb,
Africa and the Middle East. We will not go back over the accepted
uselessness of the United Nations Security Council. We will, however,
dwell on the results achieved by three of its member nations. Those of
the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Afghanistan are
well known, while China's results on the Silk Roads are more ambiguous,
since Beijing is already encountering obstacles in Central Asia and
Africa. Finally, those of Russia, for whom power has become synonymous
with the ability to cause harm and to win back its former grandeur. We
have no lessons to receive from anyone.
At least, somewhat cynically, it can be said that Moscow remains master
of its own destiny. Not all states have this power or desire. In fact,
few countries aspire to give themselves the means of their independence
and sovereignty. We could summarise this by saying that there are three
types of actors on the international scene today: the "followers" (what
we could say about Australia and the United Kingdom after the AUKUS
affair), the "by-standers" (a large proportion of Asia, the Middle East
and Africa, who are waiting to see before taking a position) and the
"hedgers" (who make the arbitrations without committing themselves:
India, Turkey). In other words, few nations are ready to exercise real
leadership in terms of good global governance. This criticism cannot be
levelled at the Europeans, who have tried to implement this unique model
of 'soft power', which has had a certain power of attraction (the
Brussels effect) and also some results (see the GATT and then the WTO
negotiations), but which is now encountering real limits in a world that
is more transactional than ever. This ultimately leads us to the
following question: after all these diplomatic and military failures,
which are not only ours, what do we want for ourselves and why should we
strive to become more autonomous, more political, more responsible?
The answer lies in the past. Everything has been done over the past 72
years to ensure that Europe is not geopolitical, from the E
CSC to the
EEC to EURATOM. Everything has been done to mutualise the major sectors
of heavy industry and not to repeat the past mistakes of collusion
between politicians and industrial magnates which provided the basis for
revenge and the Second World War. In the end, seventy-two years later,
it has to be agreed that this mutualisation has not worked out so badly.
In this multipolar world of ours, which has changed profoundly since
the pandemic, a new course must now be set if we are to continue to
exist. This course is that of political responsibility. A course almost
the opposite of the one taken since the Treaties of Rome, where economic
and military dependence on the United States has been synonymous with
prosperity and stability. What is needed is a new Marshall Plan, this
time a political one. Our own Marshall Plan. A cultural revolution to be
achieved without relinquishing our identity. Only 62 years after its
creation, the European Union must learn to combine "
soft" and "
hard"
power, not so much for the sake of a common vision of so many different
cultures, but rather to equip itself with a coherent arsenal that
protects these differences. This is what strategic autonomy is all
about, it is both a backbone and an immune system against external
attacks.
This immune system is based on a Europe of power that has to be
consolidated, a strategic culture that has to be developed and a network
of alliances and partnerships that have to be redefined.
I - Europe of power: consolidating ongoing work
The concept of European power is not new. It is exercised on a daily
basis. When Alain Peyrefitte asked General de Gaulle in 1962 "
what is the purpose of Europe?" the latter replied "
not to be dominated by the Americans or the Russians". He added, "
Europe must be an Archimedean lever for France". Jacques Chirac spoke of it being a "
power multiplier".
Other terms have emerged more recently - European sovereignty,
strategic autonomy, strategic sovereignty - all expressing the same
idea: we must act collectively whenever possible but autonomously when
necessary. The semantic debate continues to rage. For supporters of NATO
or ultra-liberal economics, strategic autonomy is an anathema because
it implies disengagement from the Americans. For those in favour of more
institutional support and a targeted industrial policy, strategic
autonomy means the ability to resist and push back. But this conceptual
debate is in some ways outmoded because European power is already a
reality... in some areas.
The European Union is already an economic and normative power
(competition law, R
EACH regulation on chemical products, RGPD, etc.), a
commercial power (the Union has signed more than 50 trade agreements
compared to 18 for Japan and 14 for the United States), a development
aid power (the Union and the Member States account for more than half of
the world's ODA), and an aeronautical and space power (Ariane, Airbus,
Galileo/Copernicus). The problem lies on the military side. To date, the
European Union has not mastered the instruments of "
hard power",
its security and defence policy is primarily a peacekeeping tool, and
its operations are modest in size compared to those of NATO or even the
UN. All this is not the result of chance but of our history. The idea of
power, whether economic or military, remains subsidiary. Legally and
politically, this power is limited and relative. European law is
confined to the competences of the European Union and strategic
dependence on the United States is in the Union's genes.
Yet something is happening. A new European dynamic is emerging and
strong lines of action are appearing. Here are three of them:
• The emergence in Europe - among the Member States and the institutions - of a "
geopolitical"
awareness in view of an increasingly competitive world. This means
taking a stand in the face of a double movement: the rise of China and
the withdrawal of the United States. The Afghan and AUKUS issues remind
us that there is no longer an unbreakable alliance and that American bad
manners are not limited to the Trump administration. We must now "
take our destiny into our own hands"
as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel reminded us. The
transatlantic link remains strong for the vast majority of Member
States, but doubts have arisen as to the solidity of US guarantees;
• The COVID crisis has not yet run its course. It has revealed the
urgent need to protect a number of critical sectors and to support the
economy. The €750 billion recovery fund is historic and, together with
the Multiannual Budgetary Framework (MFF) of more than €1,000 billion,
offers a real opportunity to restore Europe's economies and facilitate
the twin transitions of climate and digital. In the words of former
German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, now Chancellor, this recovery plan
is not yet a fiscal union, but it is a decisive step in that direction;
• Finally, the Europe of power is above all that of the Franco-German couple, described by Jacques Delors as "
the tree of life".
But these are two opposing views of power: essentially military for the
French, economic and legal for the Germans. Of course, there are
elements of convergence between Berlin and Paris for a policy of
dialogue and firmness towards Russia or Iran or for a balanced approach
with Beijing (in opposition to what the United States is demanding). But
it is much more difficult to establish a common strategic approach on
the Sahel, Libya, Syria, Turkey or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet
encouraging signals for a more politically sovereign Europe have been
given by the new German government. "
We want to increase Europe's strategic sovereignty," says the three-party programme of the SPD, FDP and Green coalition. "
Above
all this means restoring its own ability to act in a global context and
being less dependent and vulnerable in important strategic areas."
At a time when France is to hold the six-month presidency of the
Council of the European Union, Franco-German convergence on sovereignty
and strategic autonomy should help to move forward, even with a smaller
group of states if necessary (Article 44 TEU).
In short, all the political fundamentals are there - awareness on the
part of all Member States, an unprecedented budget, the return of
Franco-German leadership - to give new momentum to a more political
Europe. But there is still a long way to go. More sovereignty, more
autonomy and more power require a critical examination of the current
instruments and of those that are likely to provide new answers.
Robert Schuman Fondation
© Fondation Robert Schuman
Key
Hover over the blue highlighted
text to view the acronym meaning
Hover
over these icons for more information
Comments:
No Comments for this Article